


GENRE AND ...

Copenhagen Studies in Genre 2



Ekbatana

Ed. Sune Auken,
Palle Schantz Lauridsen, &
Anders Juhl Rasmussen

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& Anders Juhl Rasmussen

FORLAGET EKBÁTANA

Genre and ...
Copenhagen Studies in Genre 2

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Edited by Sune Auken, Palle Schantz Lauridsen,
& Anders Juhl Rasmussen

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PERSPECTIVES

GENRE AND CATEGORIZATION

Ib Ulbæk

IN THIS CHAPTER I investigate the relation between genre and all other forms of categorization. Can genre ultimately be identified with other categorizations into higher- and lower-level concepts? Put another way: is the relation of *novel* to Ida Jessen's *Den der lyver* ["The one who lies"] (2001), on the one hand, equivalent to that of *car* to the Toyota Auris, on the other? Such equivalence might at first seem unlikely. While genre has attracted intense research scrutiny, there is no corresponding interest, as far as I am aware, in the categorization of vehicles. This is not to say that the latter categorization is unproblematic; on the contrary, it is of vital consequence to society that we correctly distinguish among the various types of vehicles. One casual example of this is Denmark's herostratically famous Ellert, which grew to be regarded as an automobile rather than the electric moped [*el-knallert*] that its name implies. In the end, however, such problems have mattered much more to advertisers and judges than to researchers studying the categorization of vehicles.

In what follows, I will examine the similarities and differences between genre *qua* categorization and other forms of categorization, restricting the latter to generic relationships among concepts, as opposed, for example, to temporal or mereological relationships (on this see Madsen 1999, chapter 3). I regard the concept of genre exclusively as a predicate: "*Den der lyver* is a novel"; "This is a letter to the editor/a recipe/a doctoral dissertation, etc." Our capacity to form such predicates raises two interesting topics: the process of identification (i.e., what we need to know in order to assign such predicates), and the epistemic payoff (the knowledge

that we achieve by doing so). But before we turn to these, we must first set the concept of genre in relation to other concepts.

If genres are not like other concepts, then it is important to find out why not—to isolate what it is in the concept of genre that makes such a difference. If, on the other hand, the concept of genre *is* like other concepts, this will be a boon to genre theory: it will mean that we can use ordinary concept analysis to uncover the structure of the concept of genre.

WHAT ARE CONCEPTS?

In the philosophy of language—and particularly within the tradition of analytic philosophy—the point of departure for philosophical analysis is the *proposition*. A proposition is a sentence whose form is as follows:

1) a is P

In proposition 1), a is the argument and P is the predicate. Taken as a whole, 1) articulates a predication: P is predicated of a . Using our previous example:

2) *Den der lyver* is a novel

Den der lyver = a / argument
is a novel = P / predicate

Here various technicalities apply. Under normal circumstances, we would not include the copula in the predicate, but would take it as a given—particularly when we express it in formal language, as follows:

3) $P(a)$

3) conveys the same information as 1), namely, that *a* is *P*. In similar fashion, 2) can be expressed as 4):

4) Novel (*Den der lyver*)

Yet another technicality: if we want our analysis of this predication to start from the very beginning, then we must address the complex phrase *Den der lyver*, which itself includes a predicative element. In order to carry out predication analysis cleanly, we must start by replacing such a name bearing descriptive elements with a deictic unit designating the object of predication:

5) *This* is a novel

Here we have a purely referential unit—*this*—which identifies an object of *which* one predicates that it is a novel. It thereby becomes clear that there are two fundamental linguistic mechanisms at play in predication: a referential unit (e.g., a name) and a predicative unit (cf. Searle, 1969). The latter has been analyzed as the concept that the referenced object falls under, or (expressed more mathematically) as a set. The object that we have identified can be equipped with a pure referential expression, like the symbol *a* above: a name that symbolizes the object without characterizing it. Hence what is expressed in 5) is that the designated object belongs to the set of novels, that it is an element in the “novel” set. What is distinctive in this analysis is that the concept “novel” comes to be defined by its elements, such that the set contains and all and only those objects that are novels. (Correspondingly, the concept “red” is defined by all of the objects that belong to the “red” set, i.e., the set of red objects). All of this is basic analytic philosophy of language, formal semantic analysis, or mathematical logic (Henrichsen & Prebensen, 2003).

This approach says nothing directly about how to determine which concepts an object falls under. We have concepts—sets containing elements—or, putting it in a more down-to-earth way, we have boxes of labels that we can sort items by, as when we are tidying up a child's room. This box is for Legos, that one is for dolls, and the other one is for toy cars. What is of interest is not the boxes with their labels, but our very ability to find the right box to the right object. This ability rests (to put it quite abstractly) on two components: *the definition of the concept* and an *application component*.

The definition of the concept is identical to its meaning. It is what tells us which objects fall under the concept. This analysis derives from the German logician and philosopher Gottlob Frege, who distinguishes between a concept's intension and its extension (Frege, 2002). The extension consists of the elements that the set contains, while the intension refers to the concept's way of putting a part of the world on display, its *Art des Gegebenseins* (mode of presentation). The easiest way to explain the difference is to use one of Frege's own examples. The names "evening star" and "morning star" have different meanings, inasmuch as they are differently defined. The evening star is defined as the star that shines brightly in the western horizon when the sun has just set, while the morning star is defined as the star that shines brightly in the eastern horizon just before sunrise. The two names are thus equipped with definitions that make it possible to identify the two stars. These definitions include criteria by which one can identify the stars. The definitions thus make it possible to refer to the relevant stars as such. Such, at least, was the situation in ancient times; but later it emerged that the morning star and evening star have the same referent, namely, Venus. And this is not a star at all, but a planet. This example permits Frege to maintain a distinction between sense [*Sinn*] and reference [*Bedeutung*], intension and extension, inasmuch as this distinction is necessary to explain the difference between the statements "The evening star is equal to the evening star" and "The evening

star is equal to the morning star.” The first statement is a simple tautology; the second, by contrast, is informative, expressing an astronomical discovery and datum of knowledge. This difference, however, cannot be expressed (or maintained) when one operates solely with references or extensions: for both names *refer* merely to Venus.

The objects that fit the definition are those that fall under the concept, and are therefore elements of the set that the concept generates. If we have a definition of what “red” is, then this establishes the concept “red” and can be used to generate the set of red objects, which can be regarded in turn as the concept’s extensional correlate: “Frege uses the metaphor of a route from the name to the referent: names with different senses but the same referent correspond to different routes leading to the same destination” (Dummett, 1981, p. 96).

As noted above, we can use concepts to sort out the world. We have one bucket for green things and another for red things—the concepts “green” and “red.” But the buckets alone do not form the concepts, since they do not themselves do the sorting. Accordingly, we must assume that the definition works together with an *application component*, namely, an intelligent user of the concept who ensures that the buckets are filled with the right items. The intelligent user has the ability to apply the definition to concrete objects, and to determine whether they meet the definition’s criteria. This can be illustrated by Jerry Fodor’s playful representation, from back in 1968, of how we are able to tie our shoes (or, *mutatis mutandis*, how we can distinguish between red and green things):

Here is the way we tie our shoes:

There is a little man who lives in one’s head. The little man keeps a library. When one acts upon the intention to tie one’s shoes, the little man fetches down a volume entitled *Tying One’s Shoes*. The volume says such things as: “Take the left free end of the shoelace in the left hand.

Cross the left free end of the shoelace over the right free end of the shoelace,” etc.

When the little man reads the instruction “take the left free end of the shoelace in the left hand,” he pushes a button on a control panel. The button is marked “Take the left free end of a shoelace in the left hand.” When depressed, it activates a series of wheels, cogs, levers, and hydraulic mechanisms. As a causal consequence of these mechanisms, one’s left hand comes to seize the appropriate end of the shoelace. Similarly, *mutatis mutandis*, for the rest of the instructions.

The instructions end with the word “End.” When the little man reads the word “End,” he returns the book of instructions to his library.

That is the way we tie our shoes (1981, pp. 64).

With respect to cognition, concepts both produce and consume. A concept *provides* us with a cognitive resource; but we also *need* resources in order to be able to adopt and employ it. Fodor presents us with a cognitive competence in the form of a small man, a homunculus, who is capable of processing the data required to perform the operation of shoe-tying. And this also applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to the way in which we can use concepts. Fodor’s account illustrates the following point. It is not enough for us to have different buckets to sort the world into; we also need the homunculus to perform the operation. The little man needs not only to be able to read the buckets’ labels, but also to determine whether objects meet the criteria for being sorted into one or the other bucket. Cognitively, then, the meaning of “red” is less the label on the bucket of red objects than it is the “program” that directs the sorting mechanism. The homunculus is the algorithm that takes input data and ensures that it is treated in such a way that conceptual categorization of the phenomenon can take place (this, in abbreviated form, is the classic cognitive research program; see Bernsen & Ulbæk, 1993). In classical cognitive science, the point is to trade our ho-

munculi for the equivalent of computer programs—intelligence with mechanics—and thereby to explain the former.

Because the content of concepts is, as stated earlier, dependent on the criteria they set forth, and because we can construct all possible criteria, it follows that we can construct all of the concepts that we can possibly imagine. By definition, some concepts will have no members, e.g., contradictory concepts such as the set of objects that are both red and non-red; the empty set; the eighth day of the week; and, in a certain sense, the present king of France (found in Bertrand Russell's famous analysis of definite descriptions in *On Denoting* (1903)).

Concepts differ from names in that concepts identify properties of things, whereas names designate things. So “the present King of France” is indeed an empty set, since no such thing exists; it is, rather, a *name* inasmuch as it is a definite description. It is a specific description containing concepts, since “current,” “French,” and “king” are all properties that can be attributed to an object. There just is no single object that satisfies all three conditions simultaneously!—and hence the set of objects that it describes is empty.

Concepts differ from categories. Or, rather, categories are concepts of a special kind: fundamental concepts that express the profound realities of which the world consists. Aristotle worked with ten categories, Kant with four. Kant's are very abstract—quantity, quality, mode, and relation—while Aristotle's are more recognizable:

- (1) a thing [= *substantia*, substance]; or
- (2) how many, how much [= *quantus*, quantity]; or
- (3) how [= *qualis*, quality]; or
- (4) what relationship; or
- (5) where; or
- (6) when; or
- (7) how a thing is situated; or

- (8) what a thing has; or
- (9) what a thing does [actively];
- (10) what a thing suffers [passively]

A category is thus a concept of a particular kind: one with a more fundamental meaning. Correspondingly, there exists a special category of concepts, namely, those that constitute natural kinds. Natural kinds are concepts that apply to objects independently of human behavior. Trees are thus natural kinds, while cars are not (on this see the excellent article in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Bird & Tobin, 2015). The concept of genre is obviously not a natural kind, and neither are plenty of others. Yet though it does not constitute a natural kind, there is nonetheless something *natural* to the concept of genre—as opposed, for example, to the concept that would arise if I were to use the books that I happen to have in my bookcase to define a set of genres. Or the concept under which all things fall that are either novels or bicycles.

Here we find a point of conflict between realists and constructivists. Both agree that concepts are man-made, but they part ways on the question of whether the world that is reflected in concepts is dependent or independent of them. I will not pursue this further here (but see Schaeffer, 1983).

ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPTS VERSUS PROTOTYPE CONCEPTS

Consider our concepts “spice” and “weed.” In both cases, there is nothing inherent in the entities that fall under these concepts that *makes* them fall under them. Both weeds and spices are defined in ways that require the plants at issue to fall under their respective concepts in virtue of their relationships with people. Spices are the herbs that we use in our cooking, whereas weeds are the plants that disrupt human control over nature, whether in gardening, forestry, or agriculture. Thus even though the plants

themselves constitute natural kinds, they are here transferred out of their natural communities and into a new, artificial context instead.

For Aristotle, the essential properties of a thing are the criteria for membership in the thing's concept. Hence the horse and the cow are what they are by virtue of the animals' essential characteristics. Because they have essential features in common, they share a common umbrella term or superconcept: they are land-dwelling mammals. In addition, they have certain distinguishing features—characteristics that prevent them from falling under the same concept. Taken as a whole, this marks the start of a conceptual hierarchy, of which the classical designations are *genera* (from *genus proximum*, the “nearest relatives”) and *differentiae* (*differentia specifica*). Nowadays we call these “subconcepts” and “superconcepts” (more commonly, “umbrella terms”), or hyponyms and hyperonyms (see also Johansen & Klugeff, 2009b, p. 7-10).

In his discussion of genres, Aristotle himself employs a *genus proximum*—the rhetorical genres—and subconcepts: the deliberative genre (the political speech), the epideictic genre (the festive oration), and the forensic genre (the juridical or courtroom speech). Their distinguishing characteristics are bound up with the parameter of time, inasmuch as the political speech concerns the future, the occasional speech concerns the present, and the courtroom speech concerns the past (Aristotle, 1984a). In the *Poetics*, Aristotle distinguishes the poetic genres along similar lines (Aristotle, 1984b).

The Aristotelian way of defining concepts and concept hierarchies is a kind of essentialism, as it is grounded in immutable essences. This befits a static universe that can be explained in terms of a unified system—a *scala natura*—in which everything has its place. And where everything has its place, everything also has an essential way of being understood: the conceptual hierarchy matches the ontological order. The true concepts and the true science are, accordingly, sharp. Things either fall under a concept, or

they do not. Each concept's definition specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for things to fall under it.

The Aristotelian definition of the concept, according to which all of the objects that fall under the concept are equally good examples of it, has been a target of critique in the prototype theory of the last half-century. Here several independent theories run together: Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance (1953/2009); Berlin and Kay's studies of color categories in different cultures (1969); and Eleanor Rosch's studies of the Dani people's categorization of color (1973) (for an excellent overview of all of these, see Lakoff, 1987). Though a St. Bernard dog and a dachshund are both dogs, and thus both meet the definition of the concept "dog," they are not prototypical dogs. The latter might be a German shepherd, or a Labrador. Membership in a category (here I use the concept of "category" in a loose, everyday sense, as opposed to the narrow philosophical sense used previously) is not determined by whether a thing meets a definition, but by whether it matches a prototype. Numerous studies have demonstrated that the fewer features a thing has in common with a prototype, the less likely people are to categorize it together with the prototype. This implies that the category "dog" has more structure than merely being the set of all dogs. There are instead, as mentioned above, central and peripheral examples of the category.

This can also be of use in genre theory. The Danish writer Johannes V. Jensen's *Kongens fald* ["The Fall of the King"] (1900-1901/2007) is a more prototypical novel than Per Højlund's *6512* (1969); a scholarly article is a more prototypical example of the scholarly genre than a peer-review reader's report (see Fowler, 1982, who argues that literary genre theory is based on Wittgenstein rather than Aristotle).

The concept of prototype has also introduced structure into the hierarchy of concepts. The Aristotelian concept hierarchy is purely formal: there are superordinate and subordinate concepts, and relationships among sister concepts, but nothing more. Rosch (1973), however, identified a basic

level of concept hierarchies. You might say that you walk the “dog,” or come by “car” or “train,” bringing “wine” and “flowers”; but you cannot express the same by using superconcepts, i.e., saying that you have walked your “pet” (or, to use the biological genus, your *Canis*) or arrived in your “vehicle,” bringing an “alcoholic drink” and a “gift for the hostess.” This is not to say that you cannot speak in this way, or even that it is never done, but that the first formulations are the standardized, and so “unmarked,” expressions (meaning that they do not generate implicatures; see Grice, 1989). Subconcepts are equally unsuitable—e.g., walking one’s Cairn Terrier, or arriving in a sedan, bringing a Rhône and tulips. Again, this language is not impossible, nor even improper; but it is not the norm.

It is an open question whether genres are also organized in this manner, with basic concepts occupying the same status. Do we say—or we are more likely to say—that we are reading a “novel,” or a “mystery novel”? A “mystery novel,” or a “femi-crime,” or the latest Liza Marklund? On the other hand, we have such simple, solid designations as the novel, the short story, poetry, and drama—which are widely accessible, and of which the general public will, for the most part, be able to identify exemplars (prototypes). Nevertheless, if we consider the hierarchy of nonfiction works represented in the scholarly genres—i.e., the hierarchical sequence descending from nonfiction to scholarly nonfiction to the latter’s manifold subgenres and the concrete instantiations of these—then we find that the most natural way to speak is in terms of the concrete textual *kinds*: he is writing an “article”; she will have to hold a “lecture.” Here there is no (obvious or established) subconcept mentioned, but only the specific artifact, i.e., precisely the relevant article or lecture.

Although the classic definitional approach to genre can be contrasted with the prototypical approach by juxtaposing sharply defined and graduated concepts, commonalities between the two approaches can also be found. If one conceives of a prototype as containing the full set of characteristics against which potential genre members are to be matched up, then

one could call it the primary set of a classically defined concept, that is, the set of all entities that match the full set of characteristics displayed by the prototype. Less prototypical examples of the concept would then be differing subsets of the prototypical set. Now, what is curious about visualizing these two approaches in this way is that while one would normally set the prototype in the middle, as a central concept, and less prototypical examples along the concept's periphery, here we find the opposite: the full set of characteristics *encompasses* the smaller sets, which in turn encompass the set or sets with the fewest characteristics. To see this, consider the following example:

Set A: (1, 2, 3) (the prototype, which includes the most features of the concept);

Set B: (2, 3) (a less prototypical example of the concept);

Set C: (3) (a peripheral member)

Here C is proper subset of B, which is proper subset of A. The three sets can therefore be described as three concentric circles: (1, (2, (3))).

This completes my purely theoretical account of what it means to have a concept of a thing, whether the concept is a genre or something else. I will now proceed to discuss whether the concept of genre is like all other concepts, and if so, what we can use this comparison for.

The remainder of this study consists of two parts. The first considers the hierarchical structure of concepts: it compares the super- and subconcepts relevant to genre with corresponding structures in other areas. The second part deals with the particular knowledge-content of the concept of genre, regarding it (once again) in light of other concepts and their knowledge-content.

GENRE HIERARCHIES

For this analysis, I will use a familiar genre cluster: the scholarly genres. Here the hierarchy starts all the way at the top, so to speak. A scholarly genre has in common with everything else in the world that it is an *entity*, a thing bearing both abstract and physical features. It is produced by people, and so is an artifact—and therefore stands opposed to natural kinds, to everything that does not originate in human creation. This dichotomy also reveals how close we stand to ourselves, since human beings after all only make up a tiny part of the fabric of the universe, and our products even less. Within the category of human products, the elements of scholarly genres belong to the specific category of communications products—that is, they are *meaning-bearing* products in some way or another. Within this category, in turn, scholarly genres distinguish themselves from meaning-bearing products that are not language-related, such as pictures, gestures, etc. Here we begin to approach more familiar territory with regard to genres, as we now can say that the scholarly genre cluster is writing-based, i.e., stands in contrast to spoken genres (see Ulbæk, 2005). This mainly has to do with the fact that scholarly genres involve planned language use. One may certainly object that scholarship also involves lectures, teaching, and examinations in scholarly institutions. But the scholarly speech genres differ from conversations in general in that the former are planned in written form, whereas conversations are spontaneous. Here, of course, there is a gradation: from lectures and conference presentations, which are more or less memorized, to spontaneous discussions associated with these, or to conversations during examinations or office hours.

Scholarly genres are nonfiction, and so we meet another dichotomy, another bifurcation from the parent node: the familiar divide between fictional and nonfiction genres. Now whereas previously, higher up in the hierarchy, we located the scholarly genres on the *writing-based* branch of communicative products, here we trace them further, past the split between writing-based fictional genres and writing-based nonfiction. In other contexts, of course, we might need to consider fiction irrespective of whether

it is writing-based or not. In that case, we could start by considering fictional genres, and only then subdivide that category into spoken and written fictional genres. In fact, if we wanted to, we could also do the same for scholarly genres: we could treat oral scholarly debate as an independent branch of them (as opposed to written scholarly genres).

But now we have reached the scholarly genres themselves. For it is here that nonfiction branches out into the diverse bevy of genres that constitute it: the great genres, such as the monograph (of every kind); smaller genres like the article and the note (again, of every kind and in every medium). If we further divide these genres according to the speech-act categories of pragmatism—such as Searle’s division among representatives (or assertives), directives, commissives, expressives, and declaratives (Searle, 1979)—we find nonfiction genres in all of these categories. Scholarly genres are primarily representative; cookbook recipes are primarily directive; the commissive category is represented by party programs; the expressive category does not constitute a special text type; while legal documents can be said to do things with words, and so belong to the declarative category.

Once again, we must reflect on what the criteria for subdivision should be. I have mentioned the possibility of differentiating nonfiction genres according to Searle’s speech act categories. But they can also be subdivided in numerous other ways (see Togeby, 1993, §88, pp. 687-696). We can use sociological criteria, referring to segments of society; or we can divide up genres according to the institutions with which they are associated, and so obtain media texts, legal texts, scientific texts, etc. The classificatory criteria chosen depend in large part on the purpose of the division. This in no way implies that the concept of genre is “threatened,” or of a special character (as has been claimed by a veritable chorus in post-structuralist genre theory—for example, Derrida (1980); and see the review by Johansen & Klugeff, 2009b). Using a previous example as a parallel, one and the same herb could be regarded as a spice in regard to one division of the world, but a weed in another, and finally as a member of the

Apiaceae family in a third. This attests to the strength of the human power of conceptualization. On the one hand, it is probably impossible to imagine making genre definitions so arbitrary that *Kongens fald* could be classified as a historical novel according to one set of criteria, and as a legal document according to another; on the other hand, *Kongens fald* might very well fit into other genre categories besides “historical novel.” Similarly, the scholarly article can be classified not only as a kind of scholarly genre, but also as a kind of rhetorical text genre, where it joins the company of such unpretentious genres as the letter to the editor and the opinion piece.

Purely for the sake of illumination, I will assume that there exists some criterion that distinguishes scholarly genres from other forms of nonfiction, including not only such rhetorical close relatives as the editorial, the opinion piece, and the letter to the editor, but also texts of a pseudo-scholarly or pseudoscientific character (e.g., the *Dianetics* books of L. Ron Hubbard (e.g., 2007), or Eric von Däniken’s books about flying saucers (e.g., 1999). This is not to mention all of the other nonfiction genres, such as travel books, cookbooks, and all the other keywords that libraries use to categorize their nonfiction.

Within the set of scholarly texts, we find the research reporting genres, which are flanked by genres directed either toward students (e.g., the textbook) or the public (research dissemination). The research article of course plays a central role here, since it is the genre in which individual research results are reported; and alongside it we find research survey monographs (which may themselves reflect primary research, particularly within the humanities), as well as Ph.D. dissertations (which can similarly reflect primary research). Another close relative of the research article is the conference presentation, which again reflects recently completed or ongoing research. Other significant mini-genres include the reader’s report and the abstract, while application materials—along with other forms of assessment pertinent to funding allocation and hiring—also play a part in the research community. Finally, there are research surveys and introduc-

tions to edited works, including lexica and other reference works of every variety.

In the sphere of teaching we find the assignment genres. These range from short tasks drawn closely from classroom teaching to term papers and ultimately to larger assignments like the BA paper and the master's thesis. Here the producers are clearly not the researchers themselves but the researchers-in-training—along with the majority of students who are not themselves bound for the researchers' profession. Actual scholarly training, meanwhile, has nowadays migrated to the Ph.D. thesis and to the particular research trajectory of which it is the culmination: it is at this level, as opposed to that of the MA thesis, that genuine research is expected. Thus once again we find a permeable boundary—here between teaching and research. As a teacher, the researcher also produces texts that support teaching; these range from overhead slides to guides to additional readings to actual research summaries, culminating in the central text type (prototype) of teaching texts, namely (and of course) the textbook.

In the dissemination of research, the prototypical text is the monograph, which illuminates a subject within a researcher's areas of interest in a manner that is accessible to the layperson. Here too there may be a smooth transition from research to dissemination, depending on the field. Typical of this are works of literary history, which do have a proper research contribution as their basis, but are directed toward teaching, wider dissemination, and service to other researchers.

With such a hierarchy in place, we can now ask whether this differs significantly from other hierarchies—i.e., whether the way in which super- and subconcepts are embedded within the concept of genre truly differs qualitatively from the hierarchical embedment of other concepts. We can go some distance toward answering this question by asking whether we can construct a corresponding conceptual hierarchy for a randomly chosen second concept. To me, it seems fairly obvious that we can, simply and without further ado. Take, for example, the concept "car." Its embedment

in a conceptual hierarchy follows the pattern of the concept of genre, and indeed starts with the same move: entity → artifact. The set of cars then distinguishes itself within the set of means of transportation, which can arguably be subdivided into powered (automotive) and unpowered means. Means of transportation can also be subdivided into vehicles and other forms of transport (such as airplanes and ships). Vehicles, meanwhile, can be subdivided further according to the surface over which movement takes place; this yields the difference between automobiles and trains. Finally, we can introduce a division between wheeled vehicles and those using other systems of propulsion, such as caterpillar track. Finally, cars themselves can be subdivided according to various criteria, so that we end up with differences between commercial vehicles and private cars, or among cars that run on gas, diesel, and electricity (or other fuels). Then there are differences among types of cars: the sedan, the coupe, the station wagon; front-wheel, rear-wheel, and four-wheel drive; etc.

One of the benefits of conceptual hierarchies is that they are built into concepts in such a way that, given the concept “novel” or “car,” we can infer all of its umbrella terms from the concept itself. In other words, the concept “novel” necessarily implies its superconcepts, so that to have a novel is to have something in a particular genre, something that is fictional, something that is an artifact, something that is an (abstract) entity, etc. We find an analogous set of implications for the concept “car” ... And what is more, we also know that there are specific characteristics that distinguish entities from sister entities; if we did not know this, then we would not be able to distinguish between novels and short stories, between sedans and station wagons, between a novel by Pontoppidan and one by Helle Helle, or between a Suzuki and a BMW.

Thus we may say that, irrespective of whether we are dealing with genres or vehicles, concept hierarchies encode information. I see no special difference on this point between genre *qua* concept and other concepts. Nevertheless, we cannot simply conclude that there is no difference be-

tween genres and other categorizations. I will shortly turn to epistemic structures in order to complete my analysis within this framework; but first I will take up a few objections. One could argue that the concept of genre is historical/dynamic, context-dependent, and non-essentialist (on this see also Rasmussen, [this volume](#)). But might that not be true of all other concepts as well?

At first glance, concept hierarchies appear static. There is no simple way to integrate time into them, and so they depict a synchronous reality. Nevertheless, one can easily add to them a dynamic element that tracks their development through pruning and grafting, whenever elements are added or removed from the hierarchy. In the case of genre hierarchies, we can easily conceive of them dynamically, as when we say that the *kronik* (a type of feature story now common in Denmark, normally written by an outsider to the newspaper) arrived in Denmark via the newspaper *Politiken* in the early 1900s. But we can also do the same for other hierarchies, whenever historical development forces us to alter our concepts—as when the electric car was introduced alongside the “internal combustion engine vehicle” (whatever that was!). Or when one must make room in the plant hierarchy for a new apple breed, or a new kind of rose. Thus receptivity to a dynamic element does not seem to be a feature specific to the concept of genre.

The issue of context-dependence and anti-essentialism arises when we consider the extent to which things are what they are depending on their context, and do not seem to have any essence—any inherent identity characteristics—that makes them be what they are independently of context. But the question is whether this is the correct way in which to formulate the problem. Are we claiming that it is only in the context of *Politiken*, or of Danish media after 1900, that the *kronik* has existed, or that the essay has been transformed into the *kronik*? Or do we mean that every genre is contextually contingent, inasmuch as genres emerge and disappear under specific historical conditions or historical periods? Essentialism is compat-

ible with both ways of looking at genres. That something is historically transient—that it comes and goes—does not mean that the phenomenon has no special definitional features that make it what it is. The Montaignian essay has its distinguishing marks as typical of the Renaissance period in which it was produced; the contemporary *kronik* has distinguishing marks associated with its own period. But in both cases, there are properties that apply to subgenres, and because we categorize both of these as subgenres of the essay genre, they also have common features that cut across periods. Thus we can think essentialistically about period-specific features, as well as about common historical features that are trans-historical in this sense—all while retaining the link to a context (but see Fowler (1982) for an account that does not fully mesh with this one).


THE CONCEPT OF GENRE AS AN EPISTEMIC STRUCTURE

The analysis that follows takes the shape of a kind of speculative cognitive science (though this does not make it groundless; on this see, e.g., Bernsen & Ulbæk, 1993; Eysenck & Keane, 1990). In my introduction, I sketched briefly how the act of genre predication presupposes both that one has the *knowledge* to carry it out and that one is carrying it out with a *purpose*, namely, to achieve an advance in knowledge. I will now embark on a detailed analysis of what this knowledge consists in, and whether it differs from other conceptual knowledge.


When we encounter a text, spoken or written, we meet a number of features that jointly serve as genre indicators. This is, in other words, an inductive process, in which a finite set of identifiers must converge so that one can pass judgment and declare: “This is genre X.”

This is a common process. It has been portrayed by philosopher of science Kevin Kelly as a machine that is fed a finite stream of data, and which uses that stream to guess the next datum. Kelly calls the rule that generates these guesses—“a rule that outputs a guess about what will hap-

pen next from the finite data sequence observed so far”—an “extrapolator” or “predictor” (Kelly, Juhl, & Glymour, 1994, p. 99).



See also this pedagogical drawing of the process (p. 100):



Here is Kelly's caption: "Some $\varepsilon \in K$ is the actual data stream that π will face in the future. π reads larger and larger initial segments of ε and produces an increasing sequence of guesses about what will happen next" (p. 99).

Now this is not philosophy of science, where this model can be said to be a perfect fit for meteorological knowledge, for example, where one hopes to predict the weather on the basis of an actual and limited data series. Nevertheless, there is a thoroughgoing resemblance between the two cases, inasmuch as genre knowledge does allow one to predict a text's general structure, if not its content. And again, Kelly's model has the advantage that it also accounts for convergence—the fact that data at one stage may have led to the selection of a theory that correctly predicted the next datum and then the next as well, leading a rational agent to maintain the theory. Put another way, one set of data can suffice for convergence on a specific theory that is successful at predicting future data.

As we know, however, induction is not a safe source of knowledge. Even if we converged on a particular theory on the basis of the data set received so far, there may well come future data that will not cohere with the theory, and in that sense will falsify it (or limit it, as in the case of Newton's physics, which at near-light speeds no longer applies). New evidence can thus force a rational agent to switch theories in order to obtain a prediction that both accounts for this evidence and continues predicting new data. The shift in twentieth-century literary genre theory (as presented in the 2009 anthology edited by Johansen and Klugeff (2009a)) reflects the same inductive process: it emerges that the theory cannot rest content with Aristotelian concepts; that its categories are unclear; that particular genres do not exist (for an example of the latter, see Schaeffer, 1983).

Consider the following account of genre knowledge. We have a cognitive agent that knows genres, and which, given a text submitted sequentially, can use the data bits to determine what genre the text is (as well as, for the general reader, everything else that is determined by the purpose of

the reading). This “game” corresponds precisely to guessing a melody after just a few notes, or a text after hearing just the first phrase (“Whose woods these are...”). In parallel to the above model, the cognitive agent can converge after a receiving a given amount of data, and can determine that there is a text within a given genre. It will then be possible for further evidence to convince the agent of the rightness of this choice more and more. And in a further parallel, this convergence can be undermined by new evidence that raises doubt and leads to a recategorization of the text. Or perhaps doubts will remain, and the agent will decline to make a unique genre determination entirely.

The above should not be understood as implying that the agent reads with the *aim* of determining a text’s genre. Of course not! Texts are read for all sorts of reasons, and indeed the effort to determine a text’s genre through reading can derive from precisely these manifold reasons. Determining a text’s genre in fact helps to pinpoint its relevance to the reader.

If we find the word “novel” on the cover of a book, or “editorial” above a newspaper text (or, more generally, if there is information in a text’s paratexts; on this see Anders Juhl Rasmussen’s article in [this volume](#)), then it usually will not take the agent much consideration to decide to categorize these texts as a novel or an editorial, respectively. And, indeed, apart from cases of deliberate deception, this will also be a sensible decision and the correct choice, which the texts themselves will not give reason to challenge. There will naturally be external indicators that assist the agent in genre determination: e.g., a Ph.D. dissertation is not four pages long, and editorials are not printed on the backs of wine bottles. But there will also be internal features that give the agent “cues” to assist them in determining the texts’ genres. This is not the place to try to explain what these cues are, or how the agent finds them. That is the task of empirical (and experimental) research, and indeed would require several new research projects—beyond those already completed. But it is well known that, as with the recognition of melodies and literary texts, the recognition

of genre features is a quick and automated affair, which can be performed by most trained readers without much information. This rapid recognition is due to the fact that what is stored at the beginnings of such texts is information—and it is information that sender is providing to the recipient from the start!

While it is not the aim of this article to determine the features of various genres, we can nonetheless construct a simple systematic scheme in order to illuminate the process of genre recognition. There may be *text-external characteristics*, *text-internal characteristics*, and *relational characteristics* pertaining to the relation between text and context. Within each group, there will be a number of more or less stable characteristics that count as evidence to the cognitive agent. These characteristics can be combined in all possible permutations, which together make up the evidence that leads the agent to converge on a particular hypothesis about the text's genre. And as in the above description of the inductive process, we may find new evidence during the process—including the reading process itself—that overturns the previous hypothesis. Some such thing must have happened the first time readers encountered Morten Sabroe's New Journalism style (Sabroe, 1994), the first "Nynne" texts in *Politiken* (Lind, 2000), etc. Readers' genre expectations were bounded by the newspaper (external evidence), the lead paragraph, the illustrations (relational evidence), and their initial reading (internal evidence), so that the hypothetical categorization of these texts as normal pieces could no longer be sustained. It follows that someone had creatively (abductively) invented a genre category (or rediscovered one, in the case of Morten Sabroe, through his knowledge of American journalism) that was able to incorporate the features that did not fit with the normal pieces of the day.

The overarching process of genre categorization is, therefore, an inductive process in which a cognitive agent looks for identifiers (that is, indicators of a particular genre) in order to be able to pass judgment on a text with a certain degree of confidence.

As far as I can see, the only thing that distinguishes this process from other forms of categorization are the specific genre characteristics—the identifiers—that are used in genre determination. Put briefly, we find the same cognitive process at work in genre categorization as in other categorizations.

Here, for example, is how the Danish tv-host Soren Ryge identifies trees:

[My] many years in the horticultural industry have meant, among other things, that I cannot see a tree without immediately identifying it. I can look at its size and shape, or I can go further and look at its trunk, branches, and buds to make sure. Here I stood outside a small cozy house in Møgeltønder and gazed at a large tree in a garden, just twenty yards away. Three seconds passed, and I didn't know what it was. So I went closer, looked at the leaves, and started to get the idea. Finally I looked at the grass under the tree, and the solution lay shining right in front of me: thousands of small crabapples, autumn yellow, no doubt overpoweringly sour (Ryge, 2010, p. 28).

Soren Ryge lists his identifiers by availability. First comes “size and shape”; then “trunk, branches, and buds,” which validates the initial identification. Ryge himself reports astonishment at not having identified the tree after three seconds and at close range. Convergence takes place only when he sees the fruits: crabapples in their thousands. These turn out to be conclusive for Ryge; and that shows, first of all, that he believes he should have identified something this simple a long time ago, and conversely that the tree in its grandeur was so far from a prototypical apple tree that its identifiers could not possibly supply the necessary characteristics of an apple tree.

As I remarked previously, while there is no doubt that the identifiers at issue are different, genre identification can nonetheless be viewed as a process similar to other identification processes.

GENRE CATEGORIZATION AS CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE

What do we gain by coming to know a text's genre? Here I think I can predetermine the answer; for it must be true of genre categorization, just as of any other categorization, that significant information is to be found in disclosing a concept's umbrella term or superconcept. There is, simply put, a vast amount of knowledge in the concept of genre, when we consider its many dimensions or parameters!

These many dimensions can be represented in many ways. In the humanities, the classical method is to make a list with bullet-points. But there is also a more formal method, which we may recognize from the Cartesian coordinate system, in which each point has two values, an x - and a y -value, corresponding to its location on the x and y dimensional axes. Consider, for example, the point p in the Cartesian coordinate system that has an x -value of 1 and a y -value of 2. Instead of representing p graphically, we can express it as a *2-tuple* value as follows: $p = \langle 1, 2 \rangle$. Within the tuple's angled brackets, the first position corresponds to the x -value, and the second to the y -value. Note that there must be two parameters, corresponding to two dimensions, to represent this two-dimensional point. A point in three-dimensional space has an additional dimension, the z -axis, which means that the tuple must be expanded with an additional parameter $\langle x, y, z \rangle$ (2-tuples are also called ordered pairs, 3-tuples triples, 4-tuples quadruples, etc.; for an arbitrary number n we speak of an n -tuple. (See Maegaard, Prebensen, & Vikner, 1975, p. 57). Our ability to express arbitrarily large tuples mathematically means that we can both think and count in space in dimensions beyond the three that we know from everyday physical space. We can thus imagine space mathematically beyond the three known dimensions, even though we cannot visualize them. And this has had impli-

cations for physics, most notably by allowing us to integrate time, as the fourth dimension, by adding it to 3-tuple space coordinates to yield a 4-tuple. Then there are special physical theories that operate in more dimensions—such as so-called superstring theory, which operates with 10 dimensions. 10-dimensional coordinates can be represented simply via 10-tuples, though it is no doubt a convoluted affair to make calculations in so many dimensions at once.

Where am I heading with this? To start with, I hope to point out a similarity here to the ordinary way in which humanists treat concepts as parameters, and to their employment of lists; but I am also rather curious as to whether one can use conceptual tools like the tuple to compare complexity across concepts, and so to continue the study of differences and similarities with which this article is occupied.

The concept of genre can be regarded as multi-dimensional, that is, as containing many parameters and so also as an n -tuple—at least informally, as a cognitive tool rather than a mathematical one. In fact, the same can be done with all other concepts when we think about them cognitively, that is, when we consider the information that they encode.

As I have mentioned, my aim here is not to create an exhaustive list of the concept of genre's cognitive dimensions. My goal is to illustrate what such an analysis might look like. To this end, I have been considering the different knowledge domains that are involved in the concept of genre. Here we can use the above tripartite division—among text-external, text-internal, and text-relational characteristics—in order to systematize the concept's cognitive dimensions, as follows:

Text-external characteristics

- 1) social use: the social conditions under which the relevant textual forms are used (produced and consumed)
- 2) physical design: how the various texts physically appear
- 3) anchoring in history
- 4) other?

Text-internal characteristics

- 1) the text's overall speech act (see Ulbæk, 2009)
- 2) norms
- 3) structure
- 4) other?

Text-relational characteristics

- 1) the text's communicative situation (see also Sunesen, this volume)
- 2) state of affairs
- 3) purpose
- 4) other?

We thus have three overarching dimensions, a triple, which can be represented as follows:

$$\langle e, i, r \rangle$$

If we ignore the “other” in each of the three dimensions and regard them all as exhausted, then we can say that each dimension contains three further dimensions in turn, which we can represent as three 3-tuples within a 3-tuple:

$$\langle \langle s, f, h \rangle_e, \langle o, n, t \rangle_i, \langle k, a, m \rangle_r \rangle$$

(Here each dimension is symbolized by its initial letter in Danish or—to avoid repetition—the next letter, or the one that follows.)

Alternately, we can just list them directly as a 9-tuple:

$$\langle s, f, h, o, n, t, k, a, m \rangle$$

If we assume that every text is involved in all nine dimensions, and that knowledge of the text accordingly includes knowledge of these dimensions, then every text is an evaluation of the parameters in this 9-tuple. Put another way, every text is a point in nine-dimensional space. This gives figurative meaning to the idea that they are neighboring points in this space.

Yet it is also here that the process of formalization breaks down. The prerequisite for proper execution of this formalization is that we can re-encode the qualitative parameters as quantitative ones, so that we can assign a number to each parametric value. If it is the norm for a novel that it is a long, and the norm for a short story that it is short, then they must both be assigned a number. But this number must reflect the qualitative aspects of both, whereas it is arbitrary to assign one genre a 1 and the other a 2. The situation is still worse it comes to structure, for how can we put structures in order such that numerical values reflect this scheme? And if that cannot be done, then the numerical assignment makes no sense if our goal is to use it to indicate positions in nine-dimensional space. Thus we cannot proceed from the intuitive concept of genre relatedness to a more formal concept (at least not in this context).

The present study has investigated the possibility that the concept of genre has a special status. So far, however, we have not found that the concept “genre” distinguishes itself essentially from other concepts in general. We have shown that the concept of genre is complex and multi-dimensional *qua* epistemic structure; but we can convince ourselves with-

out difficulty that this applies to many other concepts as well. To take a familiar example, let us return to the concept “vehicle.” This concept also has social and historical content; its use involves an understanding of vehicles’ physical structure, purposes, operations, and more. In short, concepts besides genre can also be complex and multidimensional.

It is my claim—an uncontroversial one, I am assuming—that it is this complex epistemic structure that makes the concept of genre useful for end-users of texts. It is also my contention that even the relatively abstract concept of genre includes the epistemic structure examined above, which it inherits from and shares with subordinate genre concepts such as the novel or the newspaper editorial. On the whole, these subconcepts are more knowledge-intensive than the superconcepts; but the latter are knowledge-intensive too! This is an essential complement to the analysis of concept hierarchies, where we need relatively little information in order to classify a concept in a hierarchy.

CONCLUSION

This article has had a classic aim: to say something about something by comparing it to something else. Here it is the concept of genre that has been analyzed in this manner (namely, by comparing it to concepts in general) in order to determine whether it has specific intrinsic properties that distinguish it from other concepts, whatever they may be. The idea was to explore what concepts are, in general, and to distinguish between the concept itself (understood via the container metaphor), on the one hand, and our categorization ability, on the other. In the foregoing, I considered the contemporary discussion about the nature of concepts—about whether they are Aristotelian or prototypical—and advocated for a synthesis: we have need of both conceptual understandings, even if they are, in a sense, complementary.

My detailed comparison between the concept of genre and other concepts was grounded in concept hierarchies, i.e., in the fact that concepts are

connected via umbrella terms/superconcepts, and sister relationships. When we take the scholarly genre cluster as an example, the matter appears relatively simple: this kind of structure does not differ from other conceptual forms. Accordingly, I continued my investigation by examining the concept of genre as an epistemic structure.

This study was twofold, since genres are partly something to be recognized in texts, and partly something that contributes to text comprehension. In the first case, I analyzed genre recognition as an inductive process, in which the cognitive agent converges on a particular genre by identifying a number of characteristics that count as evidence for the genre identification. Inasmuch as the generation of inductive knowledge is a general process, and can again be shown, with a simple example, to be utilized in spheres other than text comprehension, I concluded once again that it partakes of common cognitive structures and processes of conceptual handling. Furthermore, the same appeared to be the case with regard to the contribution to knowledge that the application of genre categories represents for text comprehension.

In this context, I analyzed the concept of genre as complex and multi-dimensional. To show how this complexity can be conceived, I used the terminological device “tuple” as an illustrative and pedagogical tool. This was based, in turn, on a division of the concept of genre into text-external, text-internal, and text-relational characteristics that themselves exhibit gradations. Comparison with a random alternative concept—“vehicle”—revealed that the same complexity is present there as well.

My overall conclusion is, accordingly, that the concept of genre is no different from other concepts. It involves the same kind of hierarchy and the same sort of structure. This means that we can apply the same theories about the concept of genre as we do to other concepts—and we must assume that we handle this concept with the same cognitive processes that we apply to other concepts. Whether this undermines the power of the concept of genre as such must be up to the individual. Personally, I have a

liking for unitary sciences, in which different knowledge domains—different terms, theories, and methods—can all be gathered under the same scholarly hat. That too is scholarly progress.

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Frans Gregersen, b. 1949, Professor of Danish language, dr. phil., and Director of the Danish National Research Foundation’s LANCHART Centre, University of Copenhagen 2005-2015. He has contributed to the study of sociolinguistic variation in Danish by editing volume 41 of the journal *Acta Linguistica Hafniensia* in 2009, including a presentation of the data and design of the LANCHART study, and is currently working on the history of Danish linguistics concentrating on the early periods of the 19th century, cf.: Gregersen 2013 (introduction to the new edition of Niels Ege’s translation of Rasmus Rask’s prize essay “On the Origin of the Old Norse or Icelandic Language 1814”), and Gregersen 2014 (on the first professor of Nordic N.M. Petersen (in Danish)).

Bo Jørgensen, b. 1966, MA, External Lecturer, the Department of Nordic Studies and Linguistics, University of Copenhagen. Selected publications: (2013) “Skyggens sprog—sprogets skygge. Om sprogbrugere og

sprogbrug i H.C. Andersens eventyr” (The Language of the Shadow—the Shadow of Language. On Language Users and the Use of Language in The Fairy Tales of H.C. Andersen), in: D. Duncker et al. (ed.) *Betydning og forståelse* (Meaning and Understanding), (2014) “At jonglere med sand. Dekonstruktion” (Juggling with Sand. Deconstruction) in: G. Larsen & R. Rasmussen (ed.) *Blink. Litterær analyse og metode* (Wink. Literary Analysis and Method).

Gorm Larsen, b. 1963, Ph.D, Associate Professor at Department of Communication, Aalborg University Copenhagen. He has for years studied and written on narratology and especially the act of narration in fiction in light of Bakhtin. Recently he has co-edited (2014) *Blink. Litterær analyse og metode* (Wink. Literary Analysis and Method). Currently he is doing research into shame and guilt in media and literature from a philosophical and social psychological point of view.

Palle Schantz Lauridsen, b. 1955, Ph.D., Associate Professor in Media Studies at the Department of Nordic Studies and Linguistics, University of Copenhagen. Selected publications: (2014) *Sherlock Holmes i Danmark* (Sherlock Holmes in Denmark), (2013) “Verdens største show: Farver, formater og forstæder” (The World’s Greatest Show: Colour, Format, and Suburbia), in: A. Halskov et al. (ed.) *Guldfeber* (Gold fever), (2011) “Welcome to fucking Deadwood—fortælling, sprog og krop i verdens vildeste western” (Narrative, Language, and Body in the World’s Wildest Western), in: A. Halskov et al. (ed.) *Fjernsyn for viderekomne* (Advanced Viewers’ Television).

Anders Juhl Rasmussen, b. 1979, Postdoc, Ph.D., in Danish literature at the Department of Nordic Studies and Linguistics, University of Copenhagen. Selected publications: (2010) “Arenamodernisme. Udvidelser af romanens genrefelt” (Arena-modernism. Transformations of

the Novel), in: *Kritik 196* (Critique), (2012) Ph.D. thesis, *Arena-modernisme. En position i dansk litteratur* (Arena-modernism. A Position in Danish Literature), (2013) “Den produktive modsætning. Friedrich Nietzsche som opdrager for Peter Seeberg” (The Productive Contradiction. Friedrich Nietzsche as Educator of Peter Seeberg), in: *Edda 2*.

René Rasmussen, b. 1954, Associate Professor, Ph.D., in Danish literature at the Department of Nordic Studies and Linguistics, University of Copenhagen. Selected publications: (2000) *Bjelke lige i øjet—om Henrik Bjelkes forfatterskab* (Bjelke Bull’s-eye—on the Authorship of Henrik Bjelke), (2004) *Litteratur og repræsentation* (Literature and Representation), (2004), *Kognition—en liberalistisk ideologi* (Cognition—A Liberalistic Ideology), (2007) *Moderne litteraturteori 1-2* (Modern Theory of Literature 1-2), (2009) *Lacan, sprog og seksualitet* (Lacan, Language and Sexuality), (2010) *Psykoanalyse—et videnskabsteoretisk perspektiv* (Psychoanalysis—An Epistemological Perspective), (2012) *Angst hos Lacan og Kierkegaard og i kognitiv terapi* (Anxiety in Lacan and Kierkegaard and in Cognitive Therapy).

Anne Smedegaard, b. 1977, MA in Danish and Philosophy, Ph.D. fellow at the Department of Nordic Studies and Linguistics University of Copenhagen. Selected publications: (2013) “Hvem sagde hvorfor? Skolelærers situationelle og kognitive forankring” (Who Said Why? Situated and Cognitive Embedded School Genres), in: *Viden om læsning 13* (Knowledge on Reading). (In progress) “Student and Teacher Constructions of the ‘Generic Contract’ in Upper Secondary School Essays”.

Christel Sunesen, b. 1981, BA in Rhetoric, MA in Danish at the Department of Nordic Studies and Linguistics, University of Copenhagen. Selected publications: (2008) “Fortalens retorik—fra Arrebo til Oehlen-

schläger” (The Rhetoric of the Preface—from Arrebo to Oehlenschläger), in: *Danske Studier* (Danish Studies), (2014, editor) *OEHL #1—Antologi for ny dansk litteratur* (OEHL #1—Anthology of New Danish Literature), (2014) “Grundtvig og rimbrevet” (Grundtvig and the Verse Epistle) in: *Ved lejlighed. Grundtvig og genrerne* (co-editor with Sune Auken).

Erik Svendsen, b. 1954, Associate Professor at the Department of Culture and Identity, Roskilde University (RUC). Selected publications: (1996) *Kieslowskis kunst* (The Art of Kieslowski), (1998) *Det Nye. Sonderinger i dansk litterær modernisme* (The New. Exploring Danish Literary Modernism), (1999, editor) *Detaljen. Tekstanalysen og dens grænser* (The Detail. Textual Analysis and its Limits), (2000, editor) *Ud af det moderne. Den kritiske tanke anno 2000* (Beyond of the Modern. Critical Thinking Around the Year 2000), (2007) contribution to *Dansk Litteraturs Historie. 1960-2000* (Danish Literary History. 1960-2000), (2011, editor) *Litterære livliner. Kanon, klassiker, litteraturbrug* (Literary Lifelines. Canon, Classic, and the Use of Literature), (2015) *Kampe om virkeligheden. Tendenser i dansk prosa 1990-2010* (Fights on Reality. Tendencies in Danish Prose 1990-2010), (2015, co-editor) *Radioverdener* (Radio Worlds).

Ib Ulbæk, b. 1955, Associate Professor, Ph.D., in Danish language at the Department of Nordic Studies and Linguistics, University of Copenhagen. Selected publications: (1989) Ph.D. thesis, *Evolution, sprog og kognition* (Evolution, Language, and Cognition), (2001) “Pipelines and Pipelining: a Theoretical Discussion of a Concept to Explain Coherence Between Paragraphs”, in: L. Degand (ed.) *Multidisciplinary Approaches to Discourse*, (2005) *Sproglig tekstanalyse: Introduktion til pragmatisk tekstanalyse* (Linguistic Text Analysis: An Introduction to Pragmatic Text Analysis).

RESEARCH GROUP FOR GENRE STUDIES (RGGS)



The Research Group for Genre Studies moves at the forefront of existing genre research, with a wide international network, a developing interdisciplinary research profile in both English and Danish, and extensive teaching activities at all levels, including a strong profile in research education.

RGGS embraces the highly developed research in current Genre Studies. At the core of this research is the advanced, remarkably cohesive, and extensive body of knowledge established in Rhetorical Genre Studies, in English for Specific Purposes, and in Systemic Functional Linguistics. The field now spans important work within Rhetoric, Composition, Linguistics, Sociology, Ethnography, Business Communication, Composition and Information Studies.

RGGS seeks to develop and expand this research by examining and challenging its theoretical underpinnings, by expanding its scholarly reach, and by reintegrating a number of subjects into Genre Studies that have been left behind in the development of current Genre Studies. Specifically, RGGS strives to establish a cohesive connection between aesthetic and functional theories of genre, in order to **reinvigorate** the study of genre in aesthetic research fields, and the inclusion of aesthetic subjects in Genre Studies.